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Abstract—Nowadays, advanced security mechanisms exist to 
protect data, systems, and networks. Most of these mechanisms 
are effective, and security experts can handle them to achieve a 
sufficient level of security for any given system. However, most 
of these systems have not been designed with focus on good 
usability for the average end user. Today, the average end user 
often struggles with understanding and using security mecha-
nisms. Other security mechanisms are simply annoying for end 
users. As the overall security of any system is only as strong as 
the weakest link in this system, bad usability of IT security 
mechanisms may result in operating errors, resulting in inse-
cure systems. Buying decisions of end users may be affected by 
the usability of security mechanisms. Hence, software provid-
ers may decide to better have no security mechanism then one 
with a bad usability. Usability of IT security mechanisms is one 
of the most underestimated properties of applications and sys-
tems. Even IT security itself is often only an afterthought. 
Hence, usability of security mechanisms is often the after-
thought of an afterthought. This paper presents some guide-
lines that should help software developers to improve end user 
usability of security-related mechanisms, and analyzes com-
mon applications based on these guidelines. Based on these 
guidelines, the usability of email encryption is analyzed and an 
email encryption solution with increased usability is presented. 
The approach is based on an automated key and trust man-
agement. The compliance of the proposed email encryption 
solution with the presented guidelines for usable security 
mechanisms is evaluated. 
Keywords-usability; IT security; usable security; email 
encryption. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
This paper is an extension of the usability design guide 
presented in [1].  
Any improvement of the overall security level of any sys-
tem requires to improve the security level of all subsystems 
and available mechanisms as the overall security level of a 
system is determined by the weakest link in this system [2,3]. 
Howe et al. found that current software and approaches for 
security are not adequate for end users, because these mech-
anisms are missing ease of use [4]. In [2,3] end user are iden-
tified as weakest link in a company. Hence, improving the 
usability of security mechanisms helps to improve the over-
all security level of a system.  
Examples of bad usability of security mechanisms are all 
around, some are discussed in Section IV. Bad usability of 
security mechanisms may slow down the adoption of a secu-
rity system. This happened for example with email encryp-
tion. Today, it is very unlikely that an average user uses 
email encryption. Major problems for average users are key 
exchange and trust management, both having a very bad us-
ability in common email encryption solutions. Figure 1 
shows a completely useless error message during the genera-
tion of a key pair for email encryption in GPGMail [5], as 
one example of bad usability.  
 
 
Figure 1. Error message during generation  
of a key pair for email encryption in GPGMail [5] 
 
The use of email encryption in companies shows that an 
improved usability may lead to the adoption of the formerly 
despised technology. In companies, key exchange and trust 
management are usually not done by the users themselves, 
but they can rely on central infrastructures such as a central 
company directory with keys that are trusted by default (all 
employees). Such a directory ensures average users can use 
email encryption.  
The example of email encryption shows that designing 
security mechanisms with good usability is worth an effort. 
For the ordinary software developer, i.e., non security expert, 
it makes sense not to implement core security mechanisms 
like encryption algorithms or signature algorithms. Those 
mechanisms are usually available in security libraries written 
by security experts and could be easily used by software de-
velopers. However, software developers often decide on how 
security mechanisms are integrated into an application. For 
example, when implementing an email encryption security 
solution like GPGMail [5], the software developer decides 
on the interfaces for setting up trust and importing keys. 
Both mechanisms are application specific, hence must be 
implemented by the application developers. Usually, these 
functionalities are exposed to the users, hence should have a 
good usability. Guidelines for usability that focus on IT secu-
rity mechanisms and their integration into applications may 
help software developers to improve the usability of IT secu-
rity mechanisms in these applications. This paper presents 
some guidelines that should help software developers to im-
prove end user usability of security-related mechanisms. To 
underline the importance of the presented guidelines, weak-
nesses of security mechanisms in common applications re-
garding usability for end users are shown in an analysis of 
common applications and security mechanisms on basis of 
the presented guidelines. Other important aspects of software 
security, e.g., secure coding guidelines, testing of security, 
and threat analysis are out of scope of this paper. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II 
gives an overview on related work, especially on existing 
guidelines for usability. Section III presents guidelines for 
usable IT security mechanisms. Section IV analyzes the usa-
bility of some common security mechanisms and applica-
tions on the basis of the guidelines of Section III. Section V 
uses email encryption as an example on how to apply the 
guidelines on a problem from the field. An email encryption 
solution with good usability is presented. Section VI evalu-
ates the usability of the email encryption solution on the ba-
sis of the guidelines presented in Section III. Section VII 
concludes the paper and gives an outlook on future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Several standards focusing on usability in general exist, 
e.g., EN ISO 9241 [6]. In EN ISO 9241-11, which is part of 
EN ISO 9241, requirements for the usability of system are 
described. These requirements include effectiveness, effi-
ciency and satisfaction. EN ISO 9241-10, another part of EN 
ISO 9241, lists requirements for usable user dialogs. Howev-
er, the rules and guidelines of EN SIO 9241 are very general 
and not targeted on security mechanisms. The design guide-
lines presented in this paper interpret the general require-
ments and rules of EN ISO 9241 and its parts for the special 
case of security mechanisms. As the guidelines presented in 
this paper are focused only on the topic IT security, the pre-
sented guidelines are more detailed and may be easier to 
follow for software developers. 
Other publications like [7-11] focus on the usability of 
security mechanisms in special applications (e.g., email en-
cryption), or focus on the usability of special security mech-
anisms (e.g., use of passwords). The guidelines presented in 
this paper are more general such that they are useful for the 
design of a wide variety of applications and security mecha-
nisms.  
Existing guidelines for usability of security mechanisms 
like those in [12, 13] focus very much on user interface de-
sign. The design guide presented in this paper take a slightly 
different approach by focusing more on the security mecha-
nism itself. It is considered possible to change the design of a 
security mechanism for the sake of good usability. 
Markotten shows how to integrate user-centred security 
engineering into different phases of the software develop-
ment process [14]. However, the emphasize of Markotten’s 
work is more on integration of usability engineering into the 
software development process than on a design guide. 
Several works on zero-configuration IT security exist, 
e.g., [15-22]. While zero-configuration can significantly im-
prove the usability of an application, a systematic approach 
to usability for IT security is still missing. Zero-
configuration may be one building block of usable security. 
To summarize, previous works either are not focused on 
usability of IT security at all, are focused on one special as-
pect of usable IT security, or are focused on user interface 
design. This paper presents some guidelines for software 
developers to help them improve the usability of security-
related functionality.  
III. GUIDELINES FOR GOOD USABILITY OF SECURITY 
MECHANISMS 
The guidelines presented in this section are the result of 
several years in teaching IT security to beginners (and seeing 
their difficulties) as well as industrial experience in the de-
sign of products requiring IT security mechanisms that are 
operated by end users. The guidelines reflect our viewpoint 
on usability of security mechanisms. It is not assumed that 
those guidelines are complete.  It is important to notice that 
the usability of any system depends on the specific user and 
his experiences, knowledge and context of use, which in-
cludes the task at hand, the equipment at hand, and the phys-
ical and social environment of the user. Hence, it is hard to 
objectively evaluate the usability of a system. However, we 
hope that the following set of nine design guidelines coming 
from the field may be of help for software developers: 
G1 Understandability, open for all users: This paper 
focuses on usability for end users. The average end users 
should be able to use the security mechanism. Otherwise, the 
security mechanism is not useful for the intended audience. 
The average user neither has a special interest in IT security 
nor understands IT security. It is the responsibility of the 
software developer to hide as many security mechanisms as 
possible from the user. For those security mechanisms that 
are exposed to the end user it is necessary to get security 
awareness. The process of educating people is easier if suita-
ble metaphors are used. A good metaphor is taken from eve-
ryday life of the average user and is easy to grasp. A good 
metaphor is simple but powerful in its meaning. Example: an 
email encryption application should not use the term “en-
crypted email.” It is better to talk about a “secret message for 
xy” or “email readable only by xy” where xy is the receiver 
of the message. 
Usable security should be available for all users. It 
should especially not discriminate against any group of peo-
ple. For example, usable security mechanisms should not 
exclude disabled people that use special tools to access ap-
plications (e.g., Braille reader for vision impaired people). 
Example of compliance with G1: if captchas are used in an 
application, multiple versions of the captcha should exist. 
Each version of the captcha should address another sense. 
G2 Empowered users: Ideally, a usable security mecha-
nism should not be used to restrict the user in what he is do-
ing or what he wants to do. This allows end users to effi-
ciently fulfill their tasks. Efficiency is one of the general 
usability requirements of EN ISO 9241 [6]. The absence of 
user restrictions often results in a better acceptance of securi-
ty by users. The focus of a security mechanism should be on 
protecting the user. Any security-motivated restriction of the 
user should be carefully evaluated regarding necessity for 
system security and adequateness. The user should at least 
have the impression that he is in control of the system and 
not the system is controlling him. Security mechanisms 
should interfere with the usual flow of user activities in the 
least possible way. Security mechanisms should allow the 
user to execute activities in any way he wants. Other drivers 
than protecting the user and the system should not be moti-
vation for restrictions. Especially, users should not be re-
stricted by a security mechanism for the only reason of copy-
right protection or other business reasons. While such securi-
ty mechanisms are of great use for businesses, they constant-
ly restrict the user, hence force him to bypass security mech-
anisms. As users are very imaginative in bypassing unwanted 
restrictions, it is very likely that a non-security-motivated 
restriction decreases the security level of a system. The Ap-
ple iPhone is a good example: as the phone enforces many 
restrictions, many user bypass the security mechanisms by 
using a jailbreak software to revoke those restrictions.  
Another important rule is that the user should decide on 
trust relations. A security mechanism should not enforce 
trust relations given by a software vendor. The user should 
always have the possibility to revoke preinstalled trust rela-
tions. Trust relations should only be established in advance 
for the purpose of IT security. For example, having a prein-
stalled certificate to verify software patches is OK. Establish-
ing trust relations out of business purposes should be avoid-
ed. Example of compliance with G2: applications should 
have an interface that lists preinstalled certificates. The user 
should have the possibility to revoke certificates and install 
custom certificates.  
G3 No jumping through hoops: Users should only be 
forced to execute as little tasks as possible that exist only for 
IT security reasons. Otherwise, users get annoyed and refuse 
collaboration with IT security mechanisms. The ideal securi-
ty mechanism does not interfere with user tasks at any time 
(also see G2) if it is not absolutely necessary to maintain the 
user’s security. 
An example on how to not design security mechanisms 
are captchas: the user is forced to read a nearly unreadable 
and meaningless combination of letters and numbers and 
enter it before he can execute the wanted task. Example of 
compliance with G3: an application that uses a challenge-
response mechanism similar to hashcash [23] instead of a 
captcha to avoid abuse of a service by automated scripts. 
G4 Efficient use of user attention and memorization 
capability: Users have problems memorizing data that does 
not belong to their social background. Hence, they tend to 
use all kind of optimization to reduce the amount of data 
they have to remember. This is why users only use few 
passwords for all logins where they need passwords. In [24],  
it is stated that an average user uses only 6.5 passwords for 
all his web accounts. A later survey [25] found that more 
than 80% of all participants of the survey reuse a set of 
password in different places. 73% of the participants use one 
password with slight modification on different accounts. 
 But not only does an average user use the same pass-
word more than once, he also selects easy to remember 
passwords as he is not good in memorizing passwords with a 
mix of upper and lower case letters, numbers and special 
characters. Hence, security mechanisms should require the 
user only to remember little data or no data at all. Example 
of compliance with G4: an application uses an existing ac-
count from another site for login, e.g., by using OpenID [26]. 
The user can use an existing account, hence does not have to 
remember another password. 
Security mechanisms should only require as little interac-
tion with the user as possible. The security mechanism 
should only requests the attention of the user if it is absolute-
ly necessary. Interaction with the user should be done in the 
most minimalistic way. See also G1 for user interaction. Ex-
ample of compliance with G4: an email encryption applica-
tion that does not ask a user for each mail if he wants to en-
crypt the mail or not. Instead, the email application offers a 
configuration option to always encrypt mails. Additionally, 
the email composition window clearly states the current pro-
tection status and offers a possibility to override the prefer-
ences. 
G5 Only informed decisions: A user only feels secure 
and cooperates with a system if the system does not ask too 
much of him. Hence, users should only have to make deci-
sions they can decide on. If there is an important security 
decision to take, it must be ensured that the user has the ca-
pability to make this decision. This means that the user has 
enough information about the situation that requires him to 
make a decision, and it must be ensured that the average user 
is capable to make an informed decision on this issue. If it is 
not clear if the user can decide on an issue, the decision 
should be avoided. G5 is hard to achieve and requires a care-
ful examination during the design of an application. Example 
of compliance with G5: an application automatically deals 
with unknown certificates and does not prompt a user for a 
decision (see Section IV.D). 
 G6 Security as default: Good usability requires effi-
ciency. Hence, the user should not have to configure security 
when he first starts an application. Software for end users 
should always come preconfigured such that the software is 
reasonable secure and usable. All security mechanisms of a 
system should be delivered to the end user with a configura-
tion that offers adequate security for the end users. If a pre-
configuration is not possible, the configuration effort must be 
minimized for users. This requires an analysis of the security 
requirements of average users during software development 
prior to the deployment of the software to find the adequate 
security level for most users. Example of compliance with 
G6: a home wifi access point comes preconfigured with a 
random WiFi password.  
G7 Fearless System: The security system should support 
a positive attitude of the user towards the security system. A 
user with a positive attitude towards security mechanisms is 
cooperative and more likely to not feel interrupted by securi-
ty mechanisms. Hence, security mechanisms should protect 
the overall system in a way that the user neither has fear 
when the system is in a secure state nor feels secure when the 
system is not in a secure state. The security state of the sys-
tem should be visible at all times. A security mechanism 
should be consistent in its communication with its user. A 
security mechanism should not use fear to force users to 
obey security policies or get a wanted reaction. G7 is hard to 
achieve and requires a careful examination during the design 
of an application. 
G8 Security guidance, educating reaction on user er-
rors: Users tend to make mistakes, especially in respect to 
IT security. It is important that the security system hinders 
the user to make mistakes. However, as blocked operations 
can be very frustrating for users, the response of the security 
system must provide information why a given operation was 
blocked and should also offer a solution on how the user 
could proceed. The solution must be adapted on the situation 
and should keep the overall security of the system in mind. A 
security system should guide the user in the usage of security 
mechanisms. Errors should be prevented and there should be 
ways to “heal” errors. Example of compliance with G8: 
when an email encryption application fails to encrypt an 
email because of a missing public key of the recipient, the 
error message should explain how to import certificates from 
and how to verify certificates by comparing fingerprints of 
keys. To “heal” the error, the email encryption application 
offers to send the mail as password-protected PDF and in-
struct the user to call the recipient and tell him the password 
for the PDF. 
G9 Consistency: Consistency allows users to efficiently 
fulfill their tasks. Security mechanisms should fit into both 
the application and the system context where they are used. 
Security mechanisms should have the look and feel the user 
is used to. G9 is hard to achieve and requires a careful exam-
ination during the design of an application. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE USABILITY OF COMMON SECURITY 
MECHANISMS AND APPLICATIONS ON BASIS OF THE 
PRESENTED GUIDELINES 
In this section, common applications and security 
mechanisms are analyzed on basis of the guidelines given in 
Section III. The analysis identifies room for improvement in 
these applications and security mechanisms. It also shows 
some good examples for certain aspects of security usabil-
ity.  
A. Email Encryption using GPGMail 
GPGMail is a popular open source email encryption so-
lution for Mac home users [5]. The encryption process itself 
is fairly easy, usually requiring one click to enable email 
encryption. However, key and trust management requires 
significant effort. For a secure exchange of public keys, the 
user has to get the public key itself (e.g., from a key server 
or the homepage of the receiver of a message) and verify the 
authenticity of the key. Certificates may be in use. The au-
thentication requires the use of another channel to com-
municate with the key owner (e.g., telephone or in person) 
and to read a number to the owner that is meaningless for 
the user. There is no guidance for this process. Then, the 
user has to change the trust of the exchanged public key. It 
gets more complicated when using a web of trust for trust 
management: for the web of trust to work, the user must 
decide on how trustworthy a person is to verify public 
keys/certificates in addition to managing direct trust into 
keys. The distinction between those different types of trust 
is very hard to understand for average users.  
This application is compliant with the following guide-
lines:  
• G2 (user decides on trust relations) 
• G4 (minimal interaction) 
• G7 (does not frighten user) 
• G9 (usually good integration, depends on system, 
mail client) 
This application is not compliant with the following 
guidelines:  
• G1 (hard to understand trust management and pro-
cess of key verification) 
• G3 (complicated trust management) 
• G5 (hard to understand trust management and pro-
cess of key verification) 
• G6 (not set to “encrypt all” by default) 
• G8 (not much guidance with trust management) 
B. Forced Updates 
Keeping a system up-to-date requires a timely use of 
provided security patches. However, many users are quite 
lax in applying security patches. Hence, nowadays, more 
and more software providers let not the users decide on 
when to patch a system but automatically apply security 
patches as soon as available. While this relieves the user 
from applying patches, it does not take into consideration 
the situation of the user at the moment of a forced update. 
The update process may require downloading a large 
amount of data. This is a problem when the user is tempo-
rary on a low-bandwidth connection. The update process 
may change security or trust relevant configuration of the 
application, e.g., by revoking certificates or adding new 
certificates that are considered trustworthy by the software 
provider. Often, forced updates cannot be stopped by the 
user, hence hinder the user.  
This security mechanism is compliant with the follow-
ing guidelines:  
• G1 (easy to understand) 
• G5 (no user decisions involved) 
• G6 (keeps system up-to-date) 
• G7 (does not frighten user) 
• G8 (no user action necessary (or possible)) 
• G9 (well integrated) 
This security mechanism is not compliant with the fol-
lowing guidelines:  
• G2 (user can not decide to not apply a patch, user 
can not decide on time to apply patch (e.g., do not 
patch presentation application before presentation 
on CENTRIC 2012)) 
• G3 (in some cases user has to wait until patch was 
applied) 
• G4 (full attention of the user when waiting for pro-
cess to finish) 
C. Captchas 
A captcha is a security mechanism avoiding that auto-
mated scripts use services. In theory, a captcha should be 
designed in a way that only humans can solve the given 
problem. Common captcha design requires users to read a 
distorted and meaningless combination of letters and num-
bers and enter it before he can use the service. Figure 2 
shows a captcha that is even worse from a usability point of 
view. Another side effect of the use of captchas is that cap-
tchas may discriminate against disabled people (e.g., vision 
impaired people). Some websites offer different types of 
captchas (e.g., an image captcha and an audio captcha). Vi-
sion impaired people can decide to use the audio captcha. 
 
 
Figure 2. Complicated captcha 
 
This security mechanism is compliant with the follow-
ing guidelines:  
• G5 (no user decision needed) 
• G6 (always used) 
• G7 (does not frighten user) 
• G8 (gives instructions on how to use it) 
• G1 (if multiple captchas are used, e.g., image and 
audio) 
This security mechanism is not compliant with the fol-
lowing guidelines:  
• G1 (if only a single image captcha is used that dis-
criminates against disabled people) 
• G2 (does not allow users to use automation tools) 
• G3 (additional task without value for the user) 
• G4 (unnecessary user interaction) 
• G9 (many different kinds of captchas are in use) 
D. HTTPS Certificate Validation in Common Browsers 
HTTPS allows for confidential and integrity protected 
communication on the web. For example, HTTPS is used 
for online banking or shopping. Nowadays HTTPS is wide-
ly used on the web. However, for a secure communication it 
is necessary to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks. To do so, 
certificates are used to authenticate the web site that one 
communicates with. As it is not practicable to install a cer-
tificate for each and every web site one visits, most common 
browsers come with preinstalled certificates of so-called 
Certificate Authorities (CAs). A browser accepts all certifi-
cates that have been signed by such a CA. For example, 
Mozilla Firefox version 14.0.1 comes with over 70 prein-
stalled CA certificates. The browser software developer 
decides on the trustworthiness of a CA (and hence on the 
trustworthiness of web sites), not the end user.  
Figure 3 shows a typical error message of Firefox when 
encountering a certificate signed by an unknown CA. The 
text of this error message may be too complicated for aver-
age users. Above this, average users are not capable of de-
ciding on the validity of unknown certificate anyway. As 
this error often occurs, the users get used to it and usually 
just add a security exception to the system to access the web 
site, bypassing the security mechanism. Adding a security 
exception involves multiple steps (see Figure 4 for a screen-
shot of the second page of the error message when clicking 
on “Add Exception.” 
 
 
Figure 3. Typical error message of Firefox when encountering an unknown 
certificate 
 
 
Figure 4. Second dialogue page if user clicked  
"Add Exception" 
 
This security mechanism is compliant with the follow-
ing guidelines:  
• G6 (large number of preinstalled CAs for secure 
communication) 
• G8 (guidance is given, however, the texts used may 
be not suited for average users) 
This security mechanism is not compliant with the fol-
lowing guidelines:  
• G1 (hard to understand error message given when 
browser encounters an unknown certificate / a cer-
tificate from an unknown CA) 
• G2 (many preinstalled CA certificates, the user 
does not initially decide on trust relations. Howev-
er, expert users can change the trust settings) 
• G3 (annoying additional tasks when unknown cer-
tificate / a certificate from an unknown CA is en-
countered) 
• G4 (error unknown certificate happens often, hence 
most users simply ignore the message and add a 
security exception) 
• G5 (no informed decision possible) 
• G7 (error message unknown certificate implies an 
ongoing attack) 
• G9 (look and feel is not consistent with the rest of 
the browser – it changes from a website (Figure 3) 
to a window (Figure 4)) 
V. APPLICATION OF THE PRESENTED DESIGN GUIDE: 
DESIGN OF AN EMAIL ENCRYPTION SOLUTION WITH GOOD 
USABILITY 
Section IV shows usability problems of security mech-
anisms in common applications. This section shows for one 
class of application, email encryption solutions, how good 
usability of security mechanisms can be achieved using the 
guidelines presented in Section III. Section IV.A identifies 
the complicated key and trust management in email encryp-
tion solutions like GPGMail [5] as cause of most of the usa-
bility problems. Hence, the design of an email encryption 
solution presented in this paper focuses on automated key 
and trust management to improve the usability of email en-
cryption. 
A. Definitions 
Figure 5 shows a simplified email encryption setup: A 
sender wants to send an email to a receiver. The sender has 
his own private key (PrivS) that it uses for email signatures 
and for decryption of emails. Please note that usually two 
private keys are used, one for decryption and another for 
signature. For the sake of simplification, this distinction is 
omitted in this paper. In the rest of this paper, the term 
“email encryption solution” is used for the presented system 
despite the fact that the system also decrypts and signs 
emails. 
The sender keeps a list of email addresses and associat-
ed public keys. Public keys usually have meta information, 
e.g., expiration date and the like. This meta information is 
usually stored together with the public key and the associat-
ed email addresses in a certificate. To encrypt emails, the 
sender uses a public key associated with the email address 
of the receiver. 
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Figure 5. Keys used in email encryption 
 
In Figure 5, the sender uses the key of the receiver, 
called PubR, to encrypt the email. When the receiver gets an 
email, he uses the public key of the sender (PubS) to verify 
the email signature. The receiver uses his private key (PrivR) 
to decrypt messages encrypted with PubR. The simplified 
secure email setup described here is implemented by many 
email encryption solutions, e.g., GPG Mail [5]. 
B. Approach 
The email encryption solution described in this paper 
offers an automated key and trust management that does not 
require the user to take any action. Hence, it hides the most 
complicated part of email encryption from the user. For ex-
pert users, a manual key and trust management is still possi-
ble. The automated key and trust management is described 
in the following subsections in detail. 
The proposed email encryption solution offers security 
by default: all emails are encrypted and signed by default. 
The necessary keys are established by the automated key 
and trust management if necessary and without any interac-
tion with the user.  
The user can override the default security settings: he is 
offered the possibility to send emails as “public postcard” 
by a button when composing a mail. The term “public post-
card” is used as a metaphor for an unsecured email. This 
metaphor comes from the experience of a user, hence is a 
better fit than the term “unencrypted and unsigned email.” 
The proposed email solution is realized as a plug-in to an 
email client, e.g., as an extension of the well-known GPG-
Mail plugin. Existing security functionality for email is 
used, e.g., public key encryption and decryption as well as 
symmetric key encryption and decryption. The solution pre-
sented in this paper does not suppose that the receiver of an 
email uses the same email encryption solution. However, if 
the receiver of an email uses another encryption solution or 
no encryption solution at all, the email handling of the re-
ceiver may be a little bit more complicated then usual. 
C. Triggers for Invocation of Automated Key And Trust 
Management 
Actions of the key and trust management are performed 
in the following situations: 
• A user wants to send an encrypted and signed 
email (default) and does not have a valid public 
key of the receiver (PubR missing). An automated 
key exchange must take place. 
• A key of a receiver will expire in the near future, 
hence an automated rekeying is necessary. 
Automated rekeying and automated key exchange are 
described in the following. 
D. Automated Rekeying 
Automated Rekeying is invoked when the key of a re-
ceiver is about to expire. In this case, there has already been 
a key exchange in the past and a valid key for the receiver is 
still available. On the receiver side, there are two possibili-
ties: 
• The receiver has a valid key of the sender 
• The receiver does not have a valid key of the send-
er, e.g., because the key of the sender already ex-
pired and there was no rekeying or the rekeying 
was not successful. This may for example be the 
case if the receiver does not use the same email en-
cryption solution. 
For management of keys, a list of all public keys of all 
past email receivers is kept. The email encryption solution 
regularly checks for all keys if the expiration time is near. 
Already expired keys are removed from the list. If the expi-
ration time is within the time period now+maxCheck, a 
rekeying request email is sent to the owner of the associated 
public key. The constant maxCheck is a system parameter, 
e.g., 14 days. The rekeying request is sent by an ordinary 
email. It includes a certificate with the current public key of 
the sender and an explaining text that states something like: 
“Your public key with the fingerprint [fingerprint] is about 
to expire. Please send a new key. Please send the mail by 
replying to this mail and attaching a certificate with the new 
key.” The text helps receivers that do not use the same email 
encryption solution to still communicate with the sender. If 
the receiver uses the same email encryption solution, the 
receiver will not see this email but a reply message will be 
sent. The receiver part of automated rekeying is described 
below. The sender waits for a reply message with a certifi-
cate holding the new public key of the receiver. The mes-
sage must be signed with the old key of the receiver. If the 
sender does not get a reply to the rekeying request email 
before the expiration of the key, the key will be removed 
from the list. A new key exchange is necessary next time the 
sender sends an email to the receiver. Otherwise, it stores 
the received certificate and the included public key that has 
a validity starting in the future in the list of keys together 
with the current key.  
If the receiver uses the email encryption solution de-
scribed in this paper, each rekeying request email is deleted 
from the account of the user so the user never sees those 
requests in his emails. The following checks are performed: 
• Is the email signature valid? 
• Is the expiration time of the key within 
now+maxCheck (maxCheck is a system pa-
rameter see above)? 
 
  
If the first check fails, the rekeying request is ignored to 
avoid denial of service attacks on public keys. If the other 
check fails, the key of the sender is deleted from the list. A 
new key exchange will be necessary in the future.  
If none of the checks failed, the receiver of the key re-
quest email checks if he already has a key with a validity 
starting after the expiration time of the current key. If this is 
the case, it sends this key to the sender of the rekeying re-
quest by an encrypted and signed email that has the certifi-
cate with the new public key attached. Otherwise, the re-
ceiver of the key request email creates a new public key and 
associated private key with a validity starting at the expira-
tion date of the current key and an expiration date after the 
starting date. The receiver creates a certificate for the public 
key and sends the new public key as described above. Fig-
ure 6 summarizes the control flow of the receiver on recep-
tion of a rekeying request email. 
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Figure 6. Control flow after receiving a rekeying request email 
 
E. Automated Key Exchange 
The automated key exchange takes place when an email 
is sent to a receiver and no public key is available for this 
receiver. The missing key may be the result of an unsuccess-
ful rekeying  (see above). In most cases, there is no key be-
cause the sender never ever has sent an email to the receiv-
er. In both cases, it is not clear if the receiver uses the same 
email encryption solution or not. To deal with receivers not 
using the proposed email encryption solution, all messages 
used during the automated key exchange are human reada-
ble and give detailed information what must be done to in-
teract with the sender of the email. All actions can be done 
manual. Please note that good usability for the receiver can 
be achieved if both sides use the proposed solution. Two 
different automated key exchange implementations are de-
scribed below. 
1) Automated Key Exchange Using a Leap of Faith 
In IT security, a “leap of faith” means that at some 
point in time an entity has blind trust in another entity. For 
the automated key exchange this means that it is expected 
that at the time of key exchange, there is no attacker. At-
tackers may be present in the future. A leap of faith ap-
proach may for example protect against adversaries that 
hack into email accounts e.g., by guessing weak passwords. 
If a key exchange took place before the hacking of the email 
account, the exchanged keys cannot be manipulated, as the 
keys are stored in the email client of the user. The hacker 
cannot read or manipulate any email because he only has 
access to the account but not to the keys and all emails are 
encrypted and signed. However, if the key exchange takes 
place and the account was already hacked, a man in the 
middle attack is possible. Please note that automated rekey-
ing is not prone to this attack because all messages are en-
crypted and signed. 
Actions of the automated key exchange at sender side: 
1. Generate a random string with at least 20 chars. 
2. Send the random string to the receiver in an email 
that states: “There will be an encrypted email for 
you in the near future. Please use this password to 
decrypt the email. This email is not protected. 
Hence, this is the leap of faith. 
3. The sender composes the key exchange message: 
original email is modified as follows: 
a. The sender creates an ASCII armor for the 
public key. An ASCII armor is a human 
readable representation of a public key or 
certificate. GPGMail offers the possibility 
to export certificates using an ASCII ar-
mor 
b. The sender creates an encrypted PDF that 
includes the original text of the message, 
the public key in its ASCII armor, and 
some explaining text: “The sender of this 
message wants to exchange a public key 
with you. Please reply with a public key in 
an ASCII armor in an encrypted PDF us-
ing the same password as this PDF.” As 
password of the encrypted PDF, the send-
er uses the random string from step 1. The 
encrypted PDF is intended for receivers 
that do not use any email encryption solu-
tion at all.  
c. The sender creates a message encrypted 
by a symmetric key encryption using a 
string to key function to get a symmetric 
key from the random string generated in 
step 1. The message includes the original 
email text, some explaining text similar to 
the text in step 3.b and the public key of 
the sender. 
d. Finally, the sender prepares an email with 
the following text: “This message contains 
an encrypted email and an encrypted PDF. 
A password for these files was sent to you 
before.” The encrypted PDF and the 
symmetrically encrypted message are both 
attached to the email.  
4. The receiver stores the random string from step 1 
in the list of keys together with an expiration time 
that is leapOfFaithPeriode in the future 
(leapOfFaithPeriode is a system value, usu-
ally a few days). 
If the receiver uses the same email encryption solution, 
it is triggered on reception of a key exchange message. It 
performs the following actions: 
1. Store random string together with the sender ad-
dress. 
2. Remove email with random string from mail serv-
er. This ensures that an attacker does not have ac-
cess to the random string if the account is hacked 
in the future. 
3. Decrypt message using the string to key function to 
convert the random string to a key. Retrieve public 
key and store it in the list of public keys. 
4. Restore the original mail and encrypt it with the 
own public key. Delete the received mail and re-
place it with the mail encrypted with the public 
key. This avoids that an attacker can get access to 
the mail if the account is hacked in the future. Al-
so, it allows forgetting the random string. 
5. Compose an email including the own public key in 
a certificate, encrypt it with the random string us-
ing a symmetric key encryption and send it to the 
sender of the original message.  
On reception of a reply to its key exchange email, the 
sender performs the following actions: 
1. Retrieve random string from list of keys. If there is 
no random string, the message is ignored. 
2. Decrypt information 
a. If it is a PDF, open it using the random 
key as a password. Extract the certificate 
and convert the ASCII armor to a binary 
representation of the certificate. Store the 
certificate in the list of keys. 
b. If it is a symmetrically encrypted mes-
sage, use the string to key function to get 
a symmetric key from the random string. 
Decrypt the message. Store the certificate 
in the list of keys. 
3. Remove random string from the list of keys. 
2) Automated Key Exchange Using Side Channels 
The idea of the automated key exchange is to use side 
channels for the exchange of the random key. Compared 
with the leap of faith approach described in the last section, 
the use of a side channel improves the possibility that an 
attacker does not have access to the side channel used. 
Side channels can be harvested from the system the email 
client is running on. Side channels include: 
• Alternative email addresses: many people use more 
than one email address. 
• Instant messenger addresses. 
• Telephone numbers for text messaging. 
The first two side channels can easily be used to send a 
short random string. To use side channels for key exchange, 
the automated leap of faith using a leap of faith is modified 
as follows: 
In step 2, the sender sends the email message with the 
random string not to the same email address as the encrypt-
ed email but to a selection of available side channels for a 
user. If email is used as side-channel, it is very likely that 
the receiver collects more than one email account in the 
same email client. Hence, the email encryption solution has 
access to the side channel. An automated response is possi-
ble in this case. 
F. User Controlled Trust Management and Security as 
Default 
While automated key and trust management relives us-
ers from the burden of manual key and trust management, 
the user now does not decide on trust relations. This is 
against G2. The proposed usable email encryption solution 
lets the user decide on general trust management rules dur-
ing installation. The user is presented several scenarios, 
which he can state that he believes in or not. These ques-
tions are used to configure the key and trust management. 
For example, if a user answers yes to the first question, the 
“leap of faith” approach is not used for key exchange. 
G. Error Handling 
Error Handling has been omitted in this section for sake 
of clarity of the presentation. Errors may occur during the 
automated key exchange or during automated rekeying. By 
sending a message again after a certain amount of time, the 
proposed email encryption solution presented in this paper 
deals with lost emails and the like. However, there are situa-
tions where automated key exchange or automated rekeying 
permanently fails, including situations in which the intended 
receiver of an email does not want to participate in a key 
exchange. As the message has already been transferred in 
the encrypted PDF, no further action must be taken.  
VI. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED EMAIL ENCRYPTION 
SOLUTION BASED ON THE DESIGN GUIDE 
In this section, it is evaluated if the proposed email en-
cryption solution follows the design guidelines presented in 
Section III: 
G1 (Understandability, open for all users): the proposed 
solution is compliant with G1 as only good metaphors and 
scenarios are used for security related configurations. 
G2 (Empowered users): the proposed solution is com-
pliant with G2 as the user can decide on the key and trust 
management configuration. Also, the user can override the 
security settings by sending an email without protection as 
“public postcard”. 
G3 (No jumping through hoops): the proposed solution 
is compliant with G3 as there are no security specific ac-
tions the user must take. It should be noted that this is not 
true for the receiver of an email if the receiver does not use 
the proposed email encryption system. 
G4 (Efficient use of user attention and memorization 
capability): no user actions are necessary and the user does 
not have to memory anything, hence the proposed solution 
is compliant with G4. 
G5 (Only informed decisions): no user actions are nec-
essary. Hence, the proposed solution is compliant with G5. 
G6 (Security as default): emails are encrypted and 
signed by default. Hence, the proposed solution is compliant 
with G6. 
G7 (Fearless System): no user actions are necessary. 
Hence, the proposed solution is compliant with G8. 
G8 (Security guidance, educating reaction on user er-
rors): no user actions are necessary. Hence, no security 
guidance or education reaction on user errors is necessary. 
G9 (Consistency): No user actions are necessary. 
Hence, there are no consistency issues. It should be noted 
that this is not true for the receiver of an email if the receiv-
er does not use the proposed email encryption system. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper presented guidelines for software developers 
to improve the usability of security-related mechanisms. 
The analysis of security mechanisms in common applica-
tions showed weaknesses in the usability of security-related 
mechanisms as well as good examples of security usability. 
To demonstrate the application of the guidelines, the second 
part of the paper improved the identified usability weak-
nesses of one common application: email encryption. The 
approach for email encryption offers automated key and 
trust management to improve the usability of email encryp-
tion. The evaluation showed that the proposed email encryp-
tion solution is compliant with the usability design guide 
presented in this paper.   
Future work will include the design of usable security 
mechanisms for other common problems as well as a user 
satisfaction study on the effectiveness of the guidelines. The 
guidelines presented in this paper are focused on usability 
for the end user. Future extensions of the design guides will 
focus on better usability for other groups, e.g., system ad-
ministrators, testers, and developers. 
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